In assessing the quality of software, we would like to make engineering judgements similar to those based on statistical quality control. Ideally, we want to support statements like: "The confidence that this program's result at X is correct is p," where X is a particular vector of inputs, and confidence p is obtained from measurements of the software (perhaps involving X). For the theory to be useful, it must be feasible to predict values of p near 1 for many programs, for most values of X.
software quality, process improvement cannot support real engineering goals. What software engineers need is a way to directly assess software itself, to determine if it is "good enough" to fulfill its intended purpose.
1.1
What Quality Measure is Needed?
The fundamental measure of quality is proper operation of a software product. Quality software does not fail. Failure can take the form of a "crash" after which the software cannot be used without some kind of drastic restart (and often a loss of information or invested time); failure can be wrong answers delivered with all the trappings of computer authority (and thus the more dangerous); and failure can be in the performance dimension-the software is too slow to be useful. In this paper we identify software quality with the absence of failure. However, we want an engineering measure, not the binary ideal of "correct"/"not correct." Whether or not one believes that it is possible to create "zero-defect" software, to demonstrate correctness is impractical. Proof methods might do so in principle, but they have failed in practice. The alternative to formal verification is testing, but tests are only samples of software's behavior, and the best we can hope for is that they establish some kind of statistical confidence in quality.
There is no standard term for good software in the sense of "unlikely to fail." "Reliable" has a related but different technical meaning in engineering (see Section 2.3). We will define the technical term "dependable" for the intuitive idea "unlikely to fail."
1.2
Character of "Dependability"
The quality measure we define is essentially a confidence in perfection. Some desirable characteristics are:
Statistical,
For engineering tradeoffs, a quantitative dependability measure must be probabilistic. The statistical character of dependability is not that a program is (say) "95% correct," but rather that assessment of the program gives (say) "95% confidence in its correctness." Usage independent. In one application, a program works perfectly, while in another it fails. But the variety of usage, and the difficulty of capturing it, dictate that dependability be assessed without knowing software's eventual use. This requirement is particularly important in dealing with reusable or off-the-shelf software, whose future usage is unknown.
Measured by successful testing. The final tests of software ought not to fail. Hence dependability measurement is based on a successful test before release.
Previous Work
Because our results rely on three less well known (two of them recent) developments in testing theory, these are briefly presented (along with basic terminology) in this section. None of this material is new; the reader familiar with it should skip to the summary (Section 2.5) and the new results in the following Section 3.
Testing Background Terminology
A test is a single value of program input, which enables a single execution of the program. A testset is a finite collection of tests. These definitions implicitly assume a programming context that is not very realistic to simplify the discussion. This context is that of a "batch" program with a pure-function semantics: the program is given a single input, it computes a single result and terminates. The result on another input in no way depends on prior calculations. In reality, programs may have complex input tuples, and produce similar outputs. But we can imagine coding each of these into a single value, so that the simplification is not a transgression in principle. Interactive programs that accept input a bit at a time and respond to each bit, programs that read and write permanent data, and real-time programs, do not fit this simple model. However, it is possible to treat these more complex programs as if they used testsets, at the cost of some artificiality. For example, an interactive program can be thought of as having testsets whose members (single tests) are sequences of inputs.
Each program has a specification that is an inputoutput relation. That is, the specification S is a set of ordered input-output pairs describing allowed behavior.
A program P meets its specification for input • if[: if • • dora(S) then on input ~, P produces output y such that (a:,y) • S. Note that where z ~ dora(S) the program may do anything it likes, including fail to terminate, yet still meet the specification.
A program P with specification S fails on input iff P does not meet S at ~. When a program fails, the situation, and loosely the input responsible, is called a failure. The opposite of fails is succeeds; the opposite of a failure is a success.
Programmers and testers are much concerned with "bugs" (or "defects," or "errors"). The idea of "bug" in unlike the precise technical notion of "failure" because a bug intuitively is a piece of erroneous program code, while a failure is an unwanted execution result.
The technical term for "bug" etc., is fault. However appealing and necessary this intuitive idea may be, it has proved extremely difficult to define precisely. The difficulty is that faults have no unique characterization. In practice, software fails for some testset, and is changed so that it succeeds on that testset. The "fault" is then defined by the "fix," and is characterized, e.g., "wrong expression in an assignment" by what was changed. But the change is by no means unique. Literally an infinity of other changes would have produced the same effect. So "the fault" is not a precise idea.
The Oracle Problem
An oracle for specification S is a binary predicate J such that J(~, y) holds iff: either ~ ¢ dora(S) or (~, y) • S.
(That is, J is a natural extension of the characteristic function of S.) If there is an algorithm for computing J then the oracle is called effective. Thus, given a program and a test point z, an effective oracle can be used to decide mechanically if the program meets its specification at a~.
Testing theory, being concerned with the choice of tests and testing methods, usually ignores the oracle problem. It is typically assumed that an oracle exists, and the theoretician then glibly talks about success and failure, while in practice there is no oracle but imperfect human judgement.
Although it would not seem that dependability theory bears on the oracle problem, it does, because confidence in a computed result may make an oracle unnecessary. This point is further discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Blum's Self-checking Programs
Manuel Blum has proposed [BK89, BW94] an idea that is almost exactly what we want to mean by "dependability." He argues that software users are interested in a particular execution of a particular program onlythey want assurance that a single result can be trusted. Roughly, the most interesting version of his idea is that a program can check its output by performing random redundant computations. Even if these make use of the same algorithm, if the program is "close to correct," it is very unlikely that a sequence of checks could agree yet all be wrong 1.
There is one serious drawback to self-checking at run time: if in fact a program discovers an inconsistency in the checks, it has experimentally determined that the assumption of "close to correct" does not hold. Then it can only report: "Don't trust this!" Self-checking represents a viewpoint quite different from the usual testing, because it is a pointwise view of quality. Testing attempts to predict future behavior of a program uniformly, that is, for all possible inputs; Blum is satisfied to make the prediction one point at a time (hence to be useful, the measurements must be made at run time, when the point of interest is known). All of testing's problems with user profile, test-point independence, etc., arise from the uniform viewpoint, and Blum solves them at a stroke. Testing to uniformly predict behavior suffers from the difficulty that for a high-quality program, failures are "needles in a haystack" -very unlikely, hence difficult to assess. Blum turns this problem to advantage: since failures are unlikely, for one input the calculation can be checked using the same program.
The results will probably agree unless they are wronga wrong result is nearly impossible to replicate.
TRW Theory of Software Reliability
Reliability is the fundamental statistical measure of engineering quality, expressing the probability that an artifact will fail in its operating environment within a given period of operation.
Random Testing
In random testing, a testset is an unbiased sample taken from a program's input space. Pseudorandom numbers from a uniform distribution can be used as test inputs if a program's range of input values is known. A uniform distribution, however, may not be appropriate.
Operational Profiles
Statistical predictions from sampling have no validity unless the sample is "representative," which for software means that the testset must be drawn in the same way that future invocations will occur. An input probability density d(z) is needed, expressing the probability that input z will actually occur in use. Given continuous density function d, the operational distribution F(x.) is the cumulative probability that an input will occur in actual use:
O0
1 This form of self-checking is used for the graph-isomorphism problem [BK89] . In later work, Blum begins to call the randomized checks "self-correction."
To generate a testset "according to operational distribution F," start with a collection of pseudorandom reals r uniformly distributed over [0, 1] , and generate F-l(r). For a detailed presentation, see [Ham94] .
The distribution function d should technically be given as a part a program's specification. In practice, the best that can be obtained is a crude approximation to d called the operational profile. The program input space is broken down into a limited number of categories by function, and attempts are made to estimate the probability with which expected inputs will come from each category. Random testing is then conducted by drawing inputs from each category of the profile (using a uniform distribution within the category), in proportion to the estimated usage frequency.
Software Reliability Theory
Statistical parameters can be estimated for a program using random testing. Inputs are supplied at random according to the operational profile, and the failure intensity is the long-term average of the ratio of failed runs to total runs. An exhaustive test would measure failure intensity exactly. But it is an open question whether failure intensity can be estimated with less than exhaustive testing. A sample might inadvertently emphasize incorrect executions, and thus estimate a failure intensity that is a falsely high. The more dangerous possibility is that failures will be unfairly avoided, and the estimate will be too optimistic. When a release test exposes no failures, the failure-intensity estimate is zero. If subsequent field failures show the estimate to be wrong, it demonstrates precisely the anti-statistical point of view. A more subtle criticism questions whether failure intensity is stable -is it possible to perform repeated experiments in which the estimates obey the law of large numbers?
In practice there is considerable difficulty with the operational profile:
1. Usage information may not be available, or the profile obtained may be coarse.
2. Different organizations (and different individuals within one organization) may have quite different profiles, which may change over time.
3. Testing with the wrong profile always gives overly optimistic results (because when no failures are seen, failures have not been overemphasized).
It is therefore important that a fundamental testing theory avoid reliance on operational profiles. Postulating an operational profile allows us to derive the software-reliability theory developed at TRW by Nelson and others [TLN78] . Suppose that there is a meaningful constant failure intensity ® (in failures/demand) for a program, and hence a reliability of e -®M over M runs [Sho83] . We wish to draw N random tests according to the operational profile, to establish an upper confidence bound a that ® is below some level 8. These quantities are related by to trade higher confidence in a failure intensity such as h for lower confidence in a better intensity such as h ~. Another way to derive the relationship between confidence, testset size, and failure intensity, is to treat the test as an experiment checking the hypothesis that the failure intensity lies below a given value. Butler and Finelli [BF91] obtain numerical values similar to those predicted by Equation (1) in this way. They define the "ultrareliable" region as failure intensities in the range 10-S/demand and below, and present a convincing case that it is impractical to gain information in this region by testing. Ultrareliability is appropriate for safetycritical applications like commercial flight-control programs and medical applications; in addition, because of a large customer base, popular PC software can be expected to fail within days of release unless it achieves ultrareliability.
"PIE" Model of Failure 0
Sensitivity [Voa92] captures the intuition that a testset is good at exposing a program's faults. Sensitivity is a lower bound probability of failure if software contains faults, based on a model of the process by which faults become failures. A sensitivity near 1 indicates a program that "wears its faults on its sleeve": if it can fail, it is likely to fail under test.
To define sensitivity as the conditional probability that a program will fail under test if it has any faults, Voas models the failure process of a fault in one program location. For the fault to lead to failure, its location must be executed, it must produce an error in the local state, and that error must then persist to affect the result. Voas calls his model "PIE" for Propagation, Infection, and Execution. Sensitivity analysis employs a testset, but not an oracle. Voas and his co-workers have designed and constructed a tool (PISCES) that estimates sensitivity.
When the sensitivity measured by PISCES is high at a location, it means that the testset causes that location to be executed frequently; these executions have a good chance of corrupting the local state; and, an erroneous state is unlikely to be lost or corrected. The high sensitivity does not mean that the program is likely to fail; it means that if the location has a fault then the testset is likely to expose it.
2.4.2
The "Squeeze Play"
By combining sensitivity analysis with reliability theory [VM92], it is possible to obtain a measurement of probable correctness that unlike Blum's (Section 2.2) is uniform. Suppose that all the locations of a program are observed to have high sensitivity, using a testset drawn from the operational profile. Then suppose that this same testset is used in successful random testing.
(That is, the results are now observed, and no failures are seen.) The situation is then that (i) no failures were observed, but (ii) if there were faults, failures would have been observed. The conclusion is that there are no faults. This "squeeze play" plays off sensitivity against reliability to gain confidence in correctness. A quantitative analysis of the squeeze play is shown in the graph below [HV93]. The two curves force the
Voas's Sensitivity Measurements
Jeff Voas has an idea that gives testing a significant twist. failure intensity to be above h (sensitivity) and below h (reliability). This leaves only the possibility that the software is correct, for which 1-d is a confidence bound, where d is slightly more than the value of the falling curve at h. For example, with a sensitivity of .001, a random testset of 20,000 points predicts the probability that the tested program is not correct to be about 2 x 10 -9"
Evaluation of Existing Work
We summarize the three ideas of the previous sections.
Blum's self-checklng l> A pointwise measure of probable correctness.
i> Prediction: "Trust this result with probability p." (Or, "Don't trust this result!")
I> Cost (at runtime) is a small multiple of execution time for each checked result.
I> Applies only to (mathematically) well structured problems.
t> Requires no oracle, no user profile.
Software reliability I> Analogous to engineering reliability of physical devices.
~> Prediction: "Confidence C that the failure intensity is below p."
~> It is infeasible to predict reliability better than about 10-S/demand.
I> Universally applicable; independent of program characteristics.
D Requires an oracle and an accurate user profile.
Voas~s squeeze play
i> A uniform measure of probable correctness.
I> Prediction: "The probability that this program is correct is p." t> Cost is high, but probably not infeasible.
t> Based on a simplistic model, but widely applicable.
I> Requires no oracle for sensitivity; requires a user profile.
Putting Theories Together
The ideas of self-checking, reliability, and sensitivity complement each other. We now exploit their combination to obtain new dependability results. We choose to take Blum's formulation as fundamental, and to extend its application using reliability and sensitivity.
Definition : The dependability of program P at input X is the confidence probability that P is correct (as defined by its specification) at X.
For this definition to be usefully different from a "uniform" definition in which the dependability is defined for all inputs, a dependability prediction must be supported by runtime calculations, in the manner of Blum's self-correction based on randomization [BW941. Selfcorrection has been applied to only a few problems, problems whose input data has a decomposition theory, so that random variations on a computation can be performed and their results compared.
"Pointwise" Sensitivity
Voas's PIE theory of sensitivity (Section 2.4.1) becomes a "PI" theory when a program is executed for a single input X. Performing the analysis (as the PISCES tool does) yields a sensitivity hx estimating the probability that if the program can fail then it has done so (on X).
Thus 1 -hx is a lower bound on the dependability: in the worst case that there is a fault, 1 -hx estimates the chance that failure does not result.
To use high sensitivity hx requires an independent estimate supporting the correctness of the result on input X. The squeeze play (Section 2.4.2) might be interpreted as using conventional reliability to support correctness. Then the dependability estimate would be 1 -(1 -hx) N for a successful reliability test of size N.
The flaw in this analysis is the input distribution to be used for reliability. Intuitively this should sample points "similar to" X, in the sense of exploring the same internal states that occur in computing hx.
It is an open problem how to make such measurements. Intuitively, there should be a way to utilize sensitivity measurements made at run time as a kind of selfchecking -repeated high sensitivity values means that if there is a fault, all the results are likely to be failures. But again the difficulty is in the lack of connection between the measurements. For self-checking it is less and less likely that a growing series of checks can all be failures; the sensitivity measurements may have nothing to do with each other, and so a sequence of them has no extra significance.
Adding Reliability to Self-checking
Blum assumes that programs incorporating randomized self-checking have been shown to behave correctly on "random" variations of inputs. Conventional reliability theory seems the way to measure this required behavior, but reliability is not directly applicable, because a reliability measurement gives a pair of probabilities (a confidence bound on a failure-intensity ceiling). We now explain how to use this information in support of a selfchecking result, for a problem to which Blum's theory already applies (e.g., matrix multiplication).
The essence of Blum's idea is that if failures are sparse in the input space, then random variations of an execution are extremely unlikely to hit on a sequence of failures only, so a long sequence of agreeing variations indicates that the result is correct. For this argument to be applied, N variant executions must all be failures for them to agree if one (the original result) is wrong. Reliability theory can be used to calculate the probability that N random variations are all failures.
Suppose that a successful reliability test of size K has been previously conducted, using a uniform distribution (if the Blum self-checks use this distribution, as they usually do). Had N random variant executions been the beginning of a set of K executions, the selfcheck would have constituted a repetition of the reliability test. For all N initial points to be failures would make the failure intensity at least N/K in this repetition. In the special case of a successful test (F = 0), Equation (1) (Section 2.3.3) becomes
I -(i -N)K _> (2)
The meaning of the upper confidence bound a is the probability that repeating the reliability test will show a failure intensity less than N/K. Hence a is the dependability. Some values are shown in Table I Table 1 : Dependability a using reliability example, the second line in Table 1 describes the situation in which a successful reliability test (with an oracle and a uniform input distribution) was performed on a self-checking program using 1000 test points. Then at run time, if one calculation performs 10 agreeing self checks, we predict that there is only 4.3 x 10 -5 chance that the result is wrong. That is, the dependability is predicted to be 99.9957%. As the table shows, the reliability and self-checking parameters are practical, even in the ultrareliable region.
Extending Self-checking
The only examples that have been given of self-checking algorithms are ones in which the problem input may be distorted, and the original result reconstructed from the distorted computation. Thus the argument that a group of random self-checks must all be failures together (or all correct) rests on the equality of their results. This equality is available for only a few well structured mathematical problems.
The properties required to apply self-checking are those of the problem (that is, the specification), not of a particular algorithm or program whose dependability is being considered. For example, it is decomposition properties of graphs that allow the idea to be used on graph isomorphism [BK89] .
Other ways suggest themselves to argue that a group of results must all be failures if any one is. For example, suppose that the problem requires computing a function F that is differentiable at input t, and within an G-neighborhood of t, the derivative is bounded by   V(t, e) . Then within an G-neighborhood of t, F cannot vary by more than eV (t,e) . Suppose that a program PF purports to compute F. If its result at t is in error by more than eV(t, e), and if random results in an e-neighborhood vary by less than eV(t, e), then all must be wrong. Correct behavior by PF at t requires similar bounded variation. Thus any program for such a function F can be self-checked as follows:
Following the calculation of result Y on input X, repeat the calculation at N randomly chosen points in a neighborhood of X. If any calculation differs from Y by more than the bounded variation specified for F, then Y cannot be trusted. If the variation is bounded, then there are two possibilities: (1) Y is correct to within the tolerance of the bounded variation; or, (2) Y is not correct, but this becomes increasingly unlikely as N increases.
The dependability that arises from possibility (2) depends on the program's "random" behavior; for example, if this has been assessed using reliability measurements, the dependability can be read from Table 1 . The correctness tolerance (possibility (1)) may be made arbitrarily small by shrinking the neighborhood of X.
Discussion

Drawbacks of Self-checking
Our definition for dependability is based on Blum's idea of "pointwise" probability of correctness. The advantage of this formulation is that it provides a plausible interpretation for the dependability, one that sidesteps all the intuitive difficulties in treating deterministic programs as if they had stochastic properties. However, the formulation also has drawbacks.
Most important, in critical applications, it seems inappropriate to defer the prediction of dependability to run time. If the software is inadequate, instead of reporting good dependability, it will announce that a result should not be trusted. What then is the pilot of a plane under computer control, or the nurse using a medical monitor, etc., supposed to do? We suggest a partial solution to this difficulty in Section 4.4 below, but it is a basic deficiency of the theory.
Voas's work offers an alternative. His squeeze play can be used to define dependability as a probability that software is correct, but for all inputs, based on extensive pre-release reliability and sensitivity measurements. It applies to any software system with appropriate measurements (roughly, high confidence in a reliability of better than about 10-4/demand, and a sensitivity better than about 0.001) [HV93] . The drawbacks of a squeeze-play-based definition are two-fold: (1) Sensitivity analysis is too simplistic to be plausible, and (2) The squeeze play requires an operational profile in its measurements, where our definition does not. The latter is the more serious drawback, since it would preclude calculating dependability for off-the-shelf components whose application profile is unknown.
. 2 H i g h -v s . L o w S e n s i t i v i t y
Unlike reliability tests or repeated random self-checks, sensitivity values cannot be improved (except in stability) by expending measurement effort. Sensitivity is an intrinsic property of a program (and of the test input(s) used to measure it). However, it is possible to "design for testability" -to alter internal functions and data structures so that the intrinsic sensitivity is increased or decreased. If software is designed for high sensitivity, its failures are more likely to be found during testing [VM95] . However, should a failure escape detection, the software is "brittle" and more likely to fail in service; a low sensitivity might be better in the field [BS95] . Suppose that a sensitivity measurement is performed at run time for a particular input X, as described in Section 3.1. The sensitivity is an upper bound on the dependability at X, which would argue for designing for low sensitivity. However, it is expensive to measure very low sensitivity values at X, since the PI estimates are frequency counts, of perturbation effects -certainly the ultrareliable region is unapproachable. On the other hand, if the sensitivity at X is high, it is quickly estimated. An argument similar to the squeeze play indicates that high sensitivity amplifies the significance of checking: since failure is likely if there are faults, the success of even a few checks indicates correctness. Thus it appears that self-checking software should be designed for high sensitivity. The confidence provided by checking far outweighs the weak dependability bound that a low sensitivity value can supply.
. 3 R o l e o f F o r m a l M e t h o d s
It is a surprising strength of the dependability ideas that they provide a strong rationale for the use of formal methods in software development.
Sound development methods must be used to create programs whose dependability will be assessed at run time. When the self-checking definition is used with inadequate software, the self-checks do not agree, no information about dependability is available, and the software simply fails. It may be little comfort that we know it has failed. Formal methods that use mathematical formalism for specification and analysis can be used to establish new properties for checking. Because the properties that must be exploited in self-checks are specification properties, it is obviously an advantage to explore them mathematically. Section 3.3 gives an example of such an analysis.
. 4
R e d i s c o v e r i n g U s e r P r o f i l e s Operational profiles play n o role in the dependability definition or any of its applications suggested in this paper. When reliability measurements are used, they are based on uniform profiles, because these can be used in randomizing the self-checks. (No one has investigated other profiles for the randomization used in self-checking, but in any case the capricious "user" does not come into it.) However, if a user profile is known, it can be used with dependability theory. Self-checking software, capable of calculating its runtime dependability values, can be random tested with a profile. This testing requires no oracle, because the dependability itself will serve. For each test input drawn from the profile, the result can be taken to be correct if the self-checks succeed. Equation (1) then predicts the reliability parameters based on the number of successful tests. (Should the program report that self-checking failed, it is not necessarily because the calculated result is wrong, so the reliability obtained will be a pessimistic estimate.) This prediction will of course be subject to the same difficulties as any reliability measurement today (except for the oracle problem). In particular, the profile may be inaccurate, and assessment of ultrareliability will not be feasible. But a software user may be able to get a rough indication of how a program will perform in an unusual environment.
. 5
D e p e n d a b i l i t y a s a n O r a c l e
The idea suggested in Section 4.4, to use self-checking as an effective oracle, is generally applicable to program testing. First, a conventional random test is conducted with a uniform profile and an oracle as in Section 3.2. For subsequent tests, successful self-checking is equated with correctness. Table 1 can be used to select appropriate parameters for the random test and for self-checking. As the table shows, the bulk of testing will use selfchecking instead of the actual oracle.
The most interesting application is to the testing of components intended for reuse or off-the-shelf embedding in other software. The developer of the component would conduct a uniform-profile random test, and provide a self-checking harness. An end user would then test the component using a profile appropriate to its intended use, in which the self-checking harness serves as oracle. The self-checks could also serve as oracle if the end user applies another testing method, for example, if required to do so by a regulatory agency. (The component might fail these tests, causing this user to buy another component.) If testing is satisfactory, the end user could elect to leave the self-checking code in place (with appropriate actions when checking fails), or remove it for the production version.
Summary
We have taken a definition of software dependability based on Blum's idea of pointwise correctness probability, and his idea of estimating it at run time.
Software reliability theory can be used to replace Blum's somewhat vague requirement that programs "be correct on random inputs" with precise measurement of confidence in a failure intensity. The required measurements are feasible, even in the ultrareliable region.
Formal methods have a new role to play in establishing a basis for measuring dependability of the programs they are used to develop. Mathematical properties of a specification other than its input decomposition theory can be used to apply self-checking.
Finally, reliability or other testing measures can be obtained without the use of an oracle, if self-checking software is first assessed with a uniform-profile random test.
